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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 970215-CA

v.
Priority No.

MIGUEL ANGEL FLORES,

2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for murder, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp.
1995), and aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of

aggravated arson?

The reviewing court "will reverse a jury

verdict for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence . . .
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime. fff

State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d

50, 55 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124
(Utah 1989); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for

a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct?

"On appeal from a

denial of a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct, because the trial court is in the best position to
determine an alleged error's impact on the proceedings, we will
not reverse the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of
discretion.'' State v. Hav, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993).
3.

Should this Court consider a challenge to a guilty plea

taken in strict compliance with the requirements of rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, raised for the first time on appeal?
Because defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal,
it is a matter for this Court's discretion.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative statutes and rules are set out
in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1) (b) (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(1) (1995);
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Miguel Angel Flores, was charged with aggravated
arson (Arson PI. 7-11) and murder (Murder PI. 3-8). * Following a
1

The aggravated arson and murder charges were filed as
separate cases, to wit: case no. 961900814 and case no.
961900905, respectively (Arson PI. 3, 20; Murder PI. 3, 30) and
consolidated for appeal (See Murder PI. Clerk Index, p. 1).
Although the cases were consolidated, the pleadings files have
been independently paginated, and only the first page of each
transcript of the various proceedings in each case has been
aginated. Therefore, each citation to the record will identify
y name the specific case or by number the first page of the
specific proceeding, plus page number, e.g., Aggravated Arson
Pleadings File as ''Arson PI. 3" or Change of Plea Hearing as "R.

E
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jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated arson (Arson
PI. 90). Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to murder (Murder
PI. 57-58).

The trial court sentenced defendant on both

convictions to statutory five-to-life terms in the Utah State
Prison, to be served consecutively (Arson PI. 96; Murder PI. 76).
The murder sentence was enhanced with a one-year term for the use
of a firearm and a four-year term for the commission of the
offense in concert with two or more persons, all enhancements to
be served consecutively (Murder PI. 77, 78, R. 136 [15]).
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Supreme Court,
which poured-over the two cases to this Court (Arson PI. 99, 120,
123; Murder PI. 85).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Aggravated Arson
On February 18, 1996, Mary Archuleta resided at 1259 West
500 South in Salt Lake City, with her nine-year old grandson,
Joseph Guerrero, her cousin, Candido Herrera, a friend, Jacquie
Anderson, and Ms. Anderson's boyfriend (R. 131 [70, 92]). None
of them had any gang affiliation (R. 131 [70-71, 103]).

Mary and

Joseph were sleeping in her bedroom, upstairs (R. 131 [72, 94]).
Mary was awakened by the sounds of smoke detectors, fire alarms,
and breaking glass (R. 131 [73, 88-89, 94-95]).

101 [6]."
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Mary saw her

china cabinet on fire and heard windows cracking from the fire
(R. 131 [75]).

Joseph ran to his aunt's house next door and

called 911 (R. 131 [95]).

Jacquie's boyfriend extinguished the

fire with a pan of water (R. 131 [76]).

Nonetheless, the fire

melted the Venetian blinds and burned the walls and ceiling in
the vicinity of the china hutch (R. 131 [81-84]).

The window in

Candido's bedroom was broken (R. 131 [84]).
Just after the fire was extinguished, the police and fire
departments arrived at the scene. At that time Mary discovered
broken bottles and smelled gasoline, and in her bathroom was a
bottle labeled "Ice 800," containing gasoline, depicted in
State's exhibit 22 (R. 131 [85-88].

Candido was covered with

gasoline from his chest down (R. 131 [86]).

His bed was also

covered with gasoline, and among the broken bottles covering the
floor there was an intact quart-sized beer bottle filled with
gasoline, pictured in State's exhibits 17 and 18 (R. 131 [87,
105, 107-09, 111]).

After calling 911, Joseph returned to his

grandmother's house and saw rags all over the ground in both the
front and back of the house, and broken bottles and a bottle of
gasoline in his own room, and burned rags in front of the house
and beneath the bathroom and bedroom windows (R. 131 [96-97]).
Neither Mary nor Joseph nor Candido saw those who besieged their
home (R. 131 [90, 100, 114]).
Officer Jeff Payne of the Salt Lake City Police Department

4

was the first official on the scene (R. 132 [255]).

He observed

broken windows in the front and rear of the house, charred pieces
of cloth around the house, a broken "Ice" beer bottle in the
bathroom and an unbroken quart-sized Miller beer bottle in the
bedroom (R. 132 [256-62]).
Jeffrey Long, an experienced fire investigator with Salt
Lake City Fire Department investigating the scene, found broken
glass from a beer bottle and remnants of a burnt wick behind Mary
Archuleta's china closet, where most of the burning occurred (R.
132 [274-75]).

Inside the house he smelled gasoline in the

bathroom, bedroom and on Mr. Herrera's body (R. 132 [280-83]).
The broken "Ice" bottle (State's Ex. 26) and the Miller bottle
(State's Ex. 27) were tested and found negative for fingerprints
and positive for gasoline (R. 132 [287-89).

Based on his

investigation, Long concluded that the fire at the Archuleta
residence was intentionally set to burn the entire house down by
the use of four incendiary devices constructed of gasoline-filled
bottles with wicks (R. 132 [290]).

He also concluded that if all

four incendiary devices had gone off, "the structure would have
probably been fully involved and compromised to the point where
it would have collapsed probably before the fire department got
there."

He further concluded that Mr. Herrera would have had

little chance of surviving, considering the placement of the
devices and his dousing with gasoline (R. 132 [291-92]).

5

Testimony

of Melissa

Chacon

On the night of February 15, 1996, Davin Trujillo, a member
of the King Mafia Disciples gang, was shot in the head, by a
member of the rival Avenues gang (R. 131 [120-21]).

According to

Melissa Chacon, who "hung out" with the King Mafia Disciples gang
from 1992 until 1996 and had the street name of "Queen Mafia
Disciple," defendant, Cameron Lopes, and Collin Carter were
members of the King Mafia Disciples gang (R. 131 [116-19]).

Two

nights later, on February 17, these three gang members met at
Wanda Fox's apartment to make plans to retaliate for Trujillo's
shooting (R. 131 [123-26]).

Others were also present, including

Chacone, Wanda Fox, David Samora and Gus Dutson; however, only
Flores, Dutson, Lopes, Carter and Samora were involved in the
discussion to retaliate against Adam Archuleta, whom they
suspected of the shooting (R. 131 [125-31]).

Dutson suggested

that they fire bomb Archuleta's house (R. 131 [127]).
Dutson told Samora to go outside and get some bottles.

In

response, Samora went out and returned with Miller, quart size
beer bottles (R. 131 [132]).
February 18 (R. 131 [132]).

It was now about 1:00 a.m.,
At Dutson's request, Fox and Samora

went out and returned about one-half hour later with a container
of gasoline (R. 131 [133]).

In the interim, the gang members

watched television, drank, and ate (R. 131 [133]).

When Fox and

Samora returned with the gas, defendant, Lopes, Carter, Dutson,

6

and Samora retreated to a bedroom for about an hour, though
Samora was soon ejected (R. 131 [134]).

Upon exiting, the four

went into the bathroom with the four quart bottles and the
container of gasoline (R. 131 [135]).

Dutson then retrieved an

old T-shirt from Fox's bedroom, tore it up, and returned to the
bathroom (R. 131 [135-36]).

Meanwhile, Chacon and Fox watched

the television (R. 131 [135-36]).

Soon afterward, the four men

exited from the bathroom with half-filled bottles of gasoline
with rags in them.

Chacon testified that one of the bottles was

accurately depicted in State's exhibit 18 (R. 131 [136-37]).

All

four also tried on gloves and masks which she and Dutson had
purchased, and then took them off (R. 131 [137-38]).

Then, at

about 3:00 a.m., the four men left the apartment, each carrying
one of the gasoline-rag soaked bottles (R. 131 [138-39]).
About one-half hour later, they all returned.

Dutson said

that his bottle had gone in the front window and "went off" (R.
131 [139]).

Defendant said he was on the side of the house, but

was not sure whether or not his bottle went off (R. 131 [140]).
On cross examination, Chacon denied participating in the
fire bombing plan, though she realized the gang members'
intentions when Samora returned with the beer bottles and, later,
the gasoline (R. 131 [151]).

Chacon thought there were three

Miller bottles and one little regular beer bottle, the brand of
which she did not recall, although she later recalled on redirect
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examination that State's exhibit 22 showed the smaller gasolinefilled beer bottle (R. 131 [153, 162-63]).

She admitted that

unless she cooperated with the State she would lose custody of
her daughter (R. 131 [154-55]).

However, she repeatedly

testified, on redirect and recross examination, that she would
not tell a lie to protect herself from prison or to protect her
daughter who was in safe hands (R. 131 [159, 163]).

She also

acknowledged that she had been charged with aggravated arson and
murder and that in exchange for her truthful testimony at trial
she had agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and
to pay restitution and waive her right to bail and a speedy trial
in both the arson and murder cases, with the expectation that the
State would amend the conspiracy charge to be a second degree
felony, dismiss the aggravated arson charge, and recommend
probation instead of prison commitment (R. 131 [156-59]).
On redirect, Chacon also testified that her agreement in the
plea bargain was to testify truthfully, even if it showed her in
a bad light, and that she was aware that she might go to prison
for lying (R. 131 [160-61]).

Chacon acknowledged that on

February 18, she considered defendant a friend (R. 131 [161]).
Testimony

of David

Samora

David Samora first met defendant at Wanda Fox's apartment
right after the Trujillo shooting, which angered defendant (R.
131 [166, 178]).

He admitted that his memory of the evening
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before the fire-bombing was fuzzy, but that he did not recall
seeing defendant at Fox's apartment the night before the bombing
(R. 131 [168-69, 174, 176]).

On that occasion he was asked to

get some gasoline, although he did not recall being asked to get
any bottles (R. 131 [169]).

He and Fox got the gasoline at a 7-

Eleven store (R. 131 [175]).

Upon returning to Fox's apartment,

he went into a bedroom where he recalls Carter, Lopes, Chacon,
and Dutson talking about a cocktail bomb; however, upon the
occupants' request, he soon left and went to sleep in another
room (R. 131 [175-77]).

On cross examination, he acknowledged

that he was testifying with immunity (R. 131 [179]).
Testimony

of Wanda, Fox

Wanda Fox was acquainted with the King Mafia Disciples gang,
and knew defendant, Carter and Lopes to be members (R. 131
[181]).

Early on the morning of February 18, 1996, defendant,

Lopes, Dutson, Carter, Chacon, and Samora were in her apartment
(R. 131 [182-83]).

With her $3 or $4 from Chacon, Fox and Samora

went to get gasoline from a 7-Eleven store, although she did not
know its purpose (R. 131 [184, 186]).

Samora handed the gas to

one of those present, and they went into the bathroom with it and
shut the door (R. 131 [187]).

She went into the living room and

watched television, and Samora went into her bedroom and slept
(R. 131 [187]).

Somewhat later, she saw defendant, Carter, Lopes

and Dutson emerge from the bathroom, wearing masks and gloves,
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each holding 32-ounce bottles of gasoline with rags sticking out
of them.
89]).

She knew it was gasoline from the smell (R. 131 [188-

The four men left the apartment, reappearing, defendant

among them, at about 4:00 a.m. (R. 131 [189-91]).

When Chacon

asked "if they did it," Lopes responded, "Yes, we did" (R. 131
[190]).

Fox testified that she had never discussed the incident

with any of those in her apartment that night (R. 131 [191-92]).
On cross-examination, Fox testified that on the night of
February 17, people were partying and drinking (R. 131 [193-95]).
Defendant appeared between 11:00 p.m. and midnight (R. 131
[195]).

At some point in the evening she heard people, including

Dutson and Chacon, talking and expressing their anger about the
Trujillo shooting (R. 131 [195]).

Fox denied knowing the purpose

of the gasoline until she saw the four men come out of the
bathroom wearing masks and gloves and carrying the gasolinefilled bottles (R. 131 [196-97]).

Fox acknowledged that she was

not charged with aggravated arson (R. 131 [199]).
On redirect, Fox testified that she had voluntarily gone to
the police with her story, that she had not been offered anything
for her testimony, and that she was testifying truthfully (R. 131
[199-201]).

She again testified that on the night of the

incident defendant left her apartment with a gasoline-filled
bottle containing a wick, which he and the others had made, and
that he returned with the others after having been gone for an

10

hour (R. 131 [101-02]).
On recross examination, Fox emphatically denied that she
told her story to police to assert her innocence and avoid
prosecution (R. 131 [202-03]).
Testimony

of Gustave

Dutson

Gustave Dutson had been a member of the 700 Block Bloods, a
gang that later joined with the King Mafia Disciples (R. 132
[210-11]).

He identified defendant, Lopes, and Carter as a

members of the King Mafia Disciples gang (R. 132 [212-13]).

He

also identified Davin Trujillo as a member of the King Mafia
Disciples gang and stated that Trujillo's shooting angered both
defendant and him (R. 132 [214, 218]).
Within two or three days after the incident, Dutson, Chacon,
Smith, Carter, Lopes, and defendant decided to retaliate by fire
bombing a house on 5th South belonging to the Avenues gang (R.
132 [218-20]).

In aid of their plan, Dutson and Chacon bought

masks and gloves at various local stores a day or two before the
incident (R. 132 [220]).
On the night of February 17, 1996, Dutson and his cohorts
were partying and getting drunk at Fox's apartment (R. 132
[221]).

At about 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., while in the bedroom,

they decided to put their plan into action (R. 132 [221-22, 22627]).
[222]).

Dutson was certain that defendant was present (R. 132
Their plan was to drive to the alley behind the house,
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spread out with each conspirator targeting a different window,
and simultaneously throw their fire bombs (R. 132 [226-27]).
Each of the four conspirators would have a lighter and one
gasoline-filled bottle (R. 132 [227]).

Neither Fox nor Samora

participated in the planning (R. 132 [224, 228]).
Fox and Samora went to get the gasoline (R. 132 [222]).

The

conspirators' planned to put the gasoline into empty quart-sized
and 40-ounce beer bottles lying around the house (R. 132 [223]).
When Fox and Samora returned with the gasoline, he, defendant,
Lopes, and Carter started filling the bottles in the bathroom (R.
132 [223-24]).

These "Molotov cocktails'' were constructed by

filling the bottles almost to the top and then tightly stuffing
into the openings rags made of "towels or something" (R. 132
[225]).

Dutson's bomb was made of a gasoline-filled 40-ounce

"St. Ives" or "Ice 800" beer bottle (R. 132 [228]).

Each

conspirator, including defendant, made his own incendiary device,
carried his own lighter, and each carried his own incendiary
device directly to Fox's mother's car (R. 132 [228-29]).
Defendant drove while the others laid down, out of sight (R.
132 [230]).

They took the gloves to hide their fingerprints and

the masks to hide their faces, but they were not wearing the
gloves or masks when they left the apartment, having hidden them
in their clothes (R. 132 [230-31]).

Dutson confirmed that the

house they drove to and firebombed was the Archuleta home (R. 132
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[232]) .2
Upon arriving, they all ran down the alley to a garage shed
on which Dutson wrote gang symbols (R. 132 [226, 233]).

Dutson

then went around to the front porch, lit the rag in his bottle,
and threw it through a closed window (R. 132 [233-35]).

At the

same time the other conspirators spread out to the back windows
(R. 132 [234]).

Dutson's bottle broke the window and started a

fire (R. 132 [235]).

He also heard what he assumed to be the

sound of breaking windows from the back of the house (R. 132
[235]).

Then they all ran back to the car, got in, and drove

back to Fox's house (R. 132 [236-37]).

While in the car, each of

the conspirator's, including defendant, asserted that each of
their fire bombs had gone into the house and started a fire, and
they bragged, "Yeah, we got them punks" (R. 132 [237]).
After the incident, but before he was arrested, Dutson told
Chacon what had happened (R. 132 [240-41]).

Dutson testified

that he considered defendant a friend and a gang associate, that
loyalty is an attribute of gang membership, and that he never
discussed with anyone pinning the blame on defendant (R. 132
[238-42]).

Dutson also disclosed that in exchange for the

State's agreement to amend an aggravated arson charge from a
first degree felony to attempted aggravated arson, a second
2

Dutson testified that State's Exhibit 1, previously
identified by Mary Archuleta as a chart of her home (R. 131
[71]), as the house he and his cohorts fire bombed (R. 132
[232]).
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degree felony, to dismiss another charge, and to recommend
probation instead of prison, he would testify truthfully (R. 132
[242-43]).

The State also agreed to inform Dutson's sentencing

judge of his extraordinary service in testifying in this case.
The extraordinary service referred to Dutson's willingness to
testify in the face of fear of retaliation from the gang (R. 132
[243-44]).
On cross-examination, Dutson acknowledged that the Trujillo
shooting angered him and that he began plotting revenge with
Chacon (R. 132 [244]).

However, he insisted that all those

involved planned the fire bombing together (R. 132 [245]).
Dutson reiterated that his agreement with the State was based on
his testifying truthfully (R. 132 [247]).

In response to defense

counsel's final question, to wit: would he tell a lie to avoid
years in prison, Dutson responded, "Not sworn in court—that would
block [me] from doing it" (R. 132 [248-49]).
On redirect examination, Dutson asserted that no one had
suggested to him that he lie and that his attorney had advised
him to tell the whole truth (R. 132 [249-50]).

In response to

the prosecutor's asking if he had lied under oath, Dutson
responded:

"No.

get Miquel.
happened.

I have no reason to lie.

I don't hate Miguel.

We were all together.

the bargain" (R. 132 [250]).

I am not up here to

This is just some stuff that
And I am just doing my part of

Dutson also expected that if he
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lied under oath that he would wind up in prison for as much as
five years to life (R. 132 [251]).
The Murder3
The information alleged that in the early morning of
February 22, 1996, defendant, along with Carter and Lopes, went
to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill the
residents in retaliation for the Trujillo shooting one week
earlier (Murder PI. 5). There they found Joey Miera asleep on
the floor, and through an open window defendant shot Miera twice
in the head with a .20 gauge shotgun, killing him (Murder PI. 5,
80).

Information about defendant's involvement in the killing

was obtained from Chacon and Dutson and Elizabeth Chacon,
defendant's girlfriend (Murder PI. 80-81).

According to

Elizabeth Chacon, defendant confessed killing Miera, though he
later solicited her for an alibi (Murder PI. 81). In a
mirandized interview with police, defendant admitted that he had
carried a gun to the crime scene, but denied using it (Murder PI.
81).

Defendant also admitted that he was one of the original

founders of the King Mafia Disciples (Murder PI. 80).

3

The facts bearing on the murder are drawn from the
information and the trial court's findings and conclusions
concerning the applicability of the "gang" enhancement (Murder
PI. 3-5, 79-84), and are not disputed on appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

—

Evidence in support of defendant's aggravated arson

conviction was overwhelming•

Witnesses testified consistently

and in detail that defendant actively participated in the
planning, preparation and execution of the arson.

Although the

principal witnesses were, with one exception, defendant's
accomplices who received leniency or immunity, their testimony is
legally sufficient for a conviction.

Defendant cites no

authority supporting reversal based on accomplice testimony in
circumstances remotely comparable to this case, and in any case,
the jury received an instruction, drafted by defendant,
cautioning them on the use of accomplice testimony.

Contrary to

defendant's claim, which identifies minor inconsistencies, the
accomplices' testimony was uniformly consistent on all essential
points and obviously credible to the jury.
POINT II

—

The prosecutor's remark in closing, referring to the

significance of the case to the victims and danger posed to them
by the offense was a reasonable response to defense counsel's
earlier stating that the case was important to defendant and was
a statement whose accuracy is not challenged.
was improper it was not prejudicial.

Even if the remark

The remark was brief and

not unduly emphasized, the trial court sustained defendant's
objection, the jury was instructed both when the remark was made
and when it retired to consider only the evidence in the case and
16

not argument of counsel, the court observed the jury and noted no
adverse reaction, and evidence of guilt was overwhelming.
POINT III

—

The Court should decline to consider defendant's

challenge to his plea of guilty to murder because the challenge
is raised for the first time on appeal, defendant having failed
to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court.

In any

case, the claim that the trial court failed to strictly comply
with the requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of Evidence, by not
informing him during the plea colloquy of the possibility of
consecutive sentences is without merit.

Defendant's plea

affidavit stated the possibility of consecutive sentences, and
the trial court fully and adequately incorporated the affidavit
into the record
ARGUMENT
POINT I -

THE EVIDENCE WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON.

Defendant principally claims that because the only evidence
of defendant's involvement in the arson was alleged inconsistent
testimony of accomplices, who were offered either leniency or
immunity for their testimony, reasonable jurors should have
entertained a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.
12.

Br. App. at

Defendant's claim fails because the jury plainly recognized

that the evidence was consistent on all essential point,
overwhelmingly inculpated defendant and was credible.
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A.

The Standard of Review.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in
support of a conviction, this Court "will review the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury."

State v. Gibson, 908

P.2d 352, 355 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d
1150, 1156 (Utah 1991)), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996).
"When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, [the reviewing court] will reverse the conviction
only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.1

State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1996)

(quoting State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)).
In State v. Goddard. the court "reemphasize[d] the limited
role of an appellate court," in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal conviction.

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d

540, 543 (Utah 1994):
In such cases, we afford great deference to the jury
verdict. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah
1991). We will not sit as a second fact finder, nor
will we determine the credibility of witnesses. That
is the prerogative of the jury. "Where there is any
evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements
of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our
inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict."
State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert,
denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
Id.
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B.

The Evidence Amply Supports the Reasonableness
of the Jury's Verdict of Defendant's Guilt,

As recited in the information (Arson Pi. 7-8), Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-103(1) (b) (1995), provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means
of fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully
damages:
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a
participant in the offense is in the structure or
vehicle.
In the early morning hours of February 18, 1996, the home of
Mary Archuleta, located at 1259 West 500 South, was fire-bombed,
resulting in fire in the front room and the adjacent porch of the
house (R. 131 [70]; R. 132 [256, 290]).

One of the occupant's

recalled that the attack occurred at about 3:30 a.m. (R. 131
[104]).4

Officer Payne concluded that the resulting fire at the

Archuleta residence was an arson, and Fire Investigator Long
concluded that the fire was intentionally set to burn the entire
house down by the use of four incendiary devices constructed of
gasoline-filled bottles with wicks thrown into various rooms of
the house (R. 132 [256, 263, 281-82, 290]).

One of incendiary

devices was constructed of an "Ice 800" bottle, another of a
quart-sized "Miller" beer bottle (R. 132 [256-62]).

No usable or

identifiable fingerprints were found on these two items (R. 132
[287-88]).

The victims did not see the perpetrators (R. 131 [90,

4

Officer Payne, also, testified that at about 3:30 a.m. he
was investigating an unrelated matter when an occupant in a car
passing by informed him that a house "down the street" was on
fire. Officer Payne followed the car to the Archuleta residence
(R. 132 [255]).
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100, 114]) .
However, four witnesses for the State—Melissa Chacon, David
Samora, Wanda Fox, and Gustave Dutson-collectively and
consistently

testified as to defendant's knowing and intentional

involvement in the offense:

(1) defendant, along with Lopes and

Carter, were members of the King Mafia Disciples gang (R. 131
[116-119, 181]; R. 132 [212-13]), (2) the fire-bombing was in
retaliation for the shooting of a fellow gang member, Davin
Trujillo, by a rival gang (R. 131 [120-21, 123-26]; R. 132 [21820]); (3) defendant was personally angered by the Trujillo
shooting (R. 131 [178]; R. 132 [218]); (4) defendant, along with
codefendants Lopes, Carter, and Dutson, were present at Fox's
apartment in the early morning hours of February 18, 1996 (R. 131
[116-19, 123-32, 182-83]; R. 132 [221-22]); (5) defendant
gathered privately with codefendants and actively participated in
the planning of the retaliation and the construction of the
incendiary devices used to effect the fire-bombing (R. 131 [12326, 134-35, 175-77, 187]; R. 132 [223-26]); (6) the incendiary
devices consisted of four quart-sized beer bottles, three of
which "Miller" and one "Ice 800," filled with gasoline and
stuffed with rag wicks (R. 131 [135-36, 187-89]); R. 132 [223-25,
228]);5 (7) Fox and Samora supplied the gasoline (R. 131 [133,
5

There was some slight inconsistency in the size of the
beer bottles. Chacon testified on direct examination that all
four bottles were quart-sized, but on cross examination thought
one was regular ("small") sized (R. 131 [135, 153]) . Fox thought
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175, 184]; R. 132 [222]); (8) Dutson and Chacon supplied the
gloves and masks (R. 131 [137-38]; R. 132 [220]); (9) each of the
four conspirators left the apartment at about 3:00 a.m. holding
one gasoline-filled bottle stuffed with a wick, and with gloves
and a mask (R. 131 [137-39, 188-91]; R. 132 [228-31]); (10) all
of the conspirators returned within one-half hour to one hour (R.
131 [139, 189]).
As a co-perpetrator of the arson itself, Dutson testified
that defendant drove the party to the Archuleta home (R. 132
[230, 232]).

After Dutson wrote gang symbols on a garage shed,

the party spread out around the house, he to the front, the
others to the rear (R. 132 [233-35]).

Dutson lit the wick in his

bottle and threw it through a front window, which started a fire
(R. 132 [233-35]).

He also heard breaking windows from the back

of the house (R. 132 [235]).

They all then ran to the car and

drove back to Fox's house (R. 132 [236]).

While in the car,

Dutson heard each of the conspirator's, including defendant,
assert that each of their fire bombs had gone into the house and
start a fire (R. 132 [237]).

Upon the gang's return, Chacon

heard defendant say that he was on the side of the house, but was
not sure whether or not his bottle had gone off (R. 131 [140]).
Also in response to Chacon's inquiry about whether "they did it,"

all the bottles were thirty-two ounces (R. 131 [188]. Dutson
testified that they used quart-sized and forty ounce bottles (R.
132 [223]).
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Lopes responded, "Yes, we did" (R. 131 [190]),
The sufficiency of the evidence is patent.
C.

Defendant Fails to Cite Any Relevant Authority
that the Testimony of Accomplices' is Eroded by
Their Involvement in this Offense.

Defendant argues that because defendant's conviction is
based on the testimony of witnesses involved in the offense,
evidence of guilt is so speculative that the inference of guilt
is unwarranted.

Br. App. at 15. However, authority cited by

defendant is either so distinguishable or downright unsupportive
of defendant's position that it might reasonably be cited by the
State in support of defendant's guilt.

See United States v.

Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1997)(finding arson
conviction the product of speculation and conjecture "because
neither direct nor circumstantial evidence support[ed] the
government's theory that [the defendant] was motivated to commit
arson by pressure to enter an unfavorable business arrangement,"
and nothing other than the defendant's presence at the building,
from which he exited only moments after other employees, linked
him to the fire); United States v. Earl, 27 F.3d 423, 425-26 (9th
Cir. 1994)(reversing drug conviction where an informant's
contradictory testimony and some evidence linking the defendant
to the premises failed to establish the defendant's constructive
possession of a drug house); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 19498 (Utah 1987)(reversing conviction for child sex abuse largely
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founded on very young victims' "extraordinarily confused and
contradictory testimony" and victims' mother testimony, which was
significantly inconsistent with the rendition she gave to the
police); State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1055-57 (Utah
1985)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(1) (1995) in support of
conviction based on testimony of two accomplices, one receiving
leniency in plea bargain and the other receiving immunity, in
spite of directly conflicting evidence of the defendant's
participation in the offenses);6 State v. McCullar, 674 P.2d 117,
118 (Utah 1993)(per curiam)(finding corroborated testimony of two
accomplices who received immunity sufficient for conviction even
though victims could not identify defendant as a perpetrator);
State v. Pratt. 475 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970)(reversing
conviction under prior law where victim's testimony was
materially contradicted by defendant and two other witness's
testimony was "so self-contradictory, vague and uncertain that it
must be deemed wholly insufficient to corroborate the testimony

6

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995) provides:

(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to
the jury may be given to the effect that such
uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution,
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self
contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
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of [the accomplice]").7
Contrary to defendant's remarkable claim, the facts of this
case do not exhibit inconsistencies remotely akin to those of
Walker, Pratt, Earl, and Yoakam.

Br. App. at 17. Rather, the

consistent, undisputed facts recited above, casually overlooked
by defendant, are clearly sufficient to support a conclusion that
defendant acted as a principal in committing aggravated arson.
Refusing to acknowledge the overwhelming facts in support of
guilt, defendant attacks the nature of the source of those facts,
defendant's accomplices who received leniency in exchange for
their testimony, and whose testimony, he alleges, is therefore
inherently unreliable.

Br. App. at 17-19.

The State

acknowledges that historically Utah regarded accomplice testimony
as inherently suspect:
"We recognize that an accomplice may be motivated

7
When Pratt was decided, the governing law concerning
accomplice testimony was set out in Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18
(1953). Pratt., 475 P.2d at 1014 n.2. Section 77-31-18 provided:

A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of
an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely
shows the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.
The Utah legislature repealed this section and enacted a new
section 77-31-18 (Supp. 1979), which provided that "[a]
conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice." This section was later recodified at Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-17-7 (1982). See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1218
(Utah 1986). Thus, because the standard for testing the weight
of accomplice testimony has been reversed by statute since Pratt,
that case is in nowise proper authority in this case.
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to falsify because of a desire to blame someone else in
connection with the crime; or in the hope of obtaining
leniency; or the very fact that he is involved in crime
may tend to impair his credibility. These combine to
justify looking upon his testimony with caution and
refusing to permit a conviction to rest upon his word
alone, as our statute provides."
State v. Ross. 573 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 1978)(quoting State v.
Sinclair. 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465, 467-468 (1964).

In

support of that caution, the court in Ross, relied on Utah Code
Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), see supra n.6, requiring that accomplice
testimony in support of a conviction be corroborated.

Id. ("This

statute has been a part of the law of the state and territory of
Utah since 1878, and is deeply imbedded in the wisdom of our
system of law.").
However, Utah abandoned to a considerable extent its
historical scepticism regarding uncorroborated accomplice
testimony when it enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1982),
providing for conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.

See supra n.6.

In Smith, the court found the

testimony of two accomplices, one receiving leniency in plea
bargain and the other receiving blanket immunity, sufficient for
conviction even though the defendant denied participating in the
offenses.

Smith. 706 P.2d at 1054-56.

Notwithstanding

conflicting evidence and defendant's denial that he had
participated in the offenses, the court noted:
jury is not obligated to believe that evidence.
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"However, the
This court is

obliged to accept that version of the facts which the jury
apparently believed and which supports the verdict."
1056.

Id. at

The court then noted that the version of the facts

supporting the verdict showed that all the elements of the
offense were present, and therefore, "the evidence was not so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the [offenses]."

Id^ at 1056-57.

A cursory review of the facts, set out above in support of
defendant's participation in the aggravated arson, supports the
same conclusion in this case.

In the face of this evidence,

defendant's assertions that the jury was "[invited] to presume
that Flores must have been involved in the arson simply because
he [might have been] a gang member," or that apart from any
alleged gang affiliation "other indicators of Flores' motive or
intent to commit arson are lacking," see Br. App. at 19, 20, are
utterly unfounded.

Additionally, defendant's concern about

suspect accomplice testimony is overstated.
Samora was granted immunity, and Chacon and Dutson both
received leniency through reduced and dismissed charges in
exchange for their pleas to second degree felonies and their
truthful testimony at trial (R. 131 [179, 156-59]; R. 132 [24243].

Further, Chacon admitted that unless she cooperated with

the State she would lose custody of her daughter (R. 131 [154-
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55]).

However, it does not necessarily follow that testimony is

false because it is given in connection with an offer of immunity
or through a plea bargain, especially where, as in this case, the
jury found that the challenged witnesses were credible.

In

addition to the overall consistency of their testimony, both
Chacon and Dutson emphatically and convincingly testified that
their agreements required their truthful testimony, that they
risked prison if they did lie under oath, and that they were, in
fact, telling the truth (R. 131 [159-61]; R. 132 [248-50]).8
Indeed, Dutson's credibility was likely enhanced by the fact that
he risked retaliation from the King Mafia Disciples merely by
testifying for the State (R. 132 [243-44]).

Commensurate with

the limited value of his testimony, Samora was only asked if he
was testifying with immunity, which he acknowledged (R. 131
[179]).

Finally, although she assisted in obtaining the

gasoline, Fox was never charged with any offense, contrary to
defendant's assertion, see Br. App. at 18, and never offered
immunity for her testimony (R. 131 [199-201]).

Her testimony

alone, not subject to the traditional caution regarding
accomplice testimony, plus the undisputed fact of the fire-

8

Chacon also made clear that her cooperation with the
State would not compel her to lie in order "get her daughter
back," because her daughter would be taken care of whether or not
she went to prison (R. 131 [163]). Dutson also stated that he
did not hate defendant and was not out to get defendant by
testifying, but merely doing his part of the bargain (R. 132
[250]).
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bombing itself, was sufficient to convict defendant as an
accomplice.9
Moreover, as in Smith, 706 P.2d at 1055 n.3, and pursuant to
section 77-17-7(2), the trial court gave an instruction, drafted
by defendant (Arson PI. 54), cautioning the jury on the proper
regard of testimony of accomplices receiving leniency through
plea agreements (Jury Instruction #9, Arson PI. 66, attached at
Addendum).

The jury was additionally instructed that "[i]rt

judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the
witnesses you have a right to take into consideration their bias,
their interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive
or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown" (Jury
Instruction #8, Arson PI. 65). On these facts the jury's
reliance on the challenged witness's testimony not unreasonable.
D.

Alleged Inconsistencies in the Challenged Witness's
Testimony are Immaterial in Themselves and Alongside
the Mass of Consistent. Material Evidence, Corroborated
by Undisputed Testimony of Official Investigators.

In further support of his claim that the testimony of Fox,
Samora, Chacon, and Dutson is suspect, defendant claims that

9

Fox testified that (1) defendant was a King Mafia
Disciple gang member (R. 131 [181); (2) that he was at her
apartment with other gang members in the early morning of
February 18, 1996 (R. 131 [182-83]); (3) gang members took the
gasoline into her bathroom, from which they, including defendant,
later emerged wearing masks and gloves, each holding 32-ounce
bottles of gasoline with rags sticking out of them (R. 131 [18789]); and (4) codefendant Lopes, upon returning with the other
three conspirators, admitted that they "did it* (R. 131 190]).
The jury was given an accomplice liability instruction (Arson PI.
83) .
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their testimony is "rife with inconsistencies."
22.

Br. App. at 21-

In the face of consistent, corroborative evidence, this

claim is without merit.

Defendant's

Presence

at Fox's

Apartment

Samora did not recall seeing defendant at Fox's apartment
the night before the bombing, but also admitted that his memory
of the evening before the fire-bombing was fuzzy, as was
evidenced by his testimony generally (R. 131 [168-69, 174, 176]).
However, defendant misrepresents Dutson's and Chacon's testimony,
and with blatant disregard of the record suggests that Dutson,
Chacon, and Fox suspiciously remembered defendant, but not the
other conspirators.

Br. App. at 22.

In response to whether

there had been other people at Fox's apartment who had left,
Dutson said: "I think there had been.

I was pretty drunk so I

don't remember that night very good" (R. 132 [222]).

In fact,

Dutson was overly modest about his memory, since the record
plainly shows that he testified at length and in detail about the
events of that night.

Most importantly, both he and Chacon

consistently testified that defendant, along with Dutson, Lopes,
and Carter, were at Fox's apartment to plan and prepare the arson
and, in fact, committed the offense (R. 132 [221-233, 236-37]; R.
131 [116-19, 123-40).

Regarding Fox, defendant admits that she

recalled that defendant arrived at her apartment with the other
three conspirators.

Br. App. at 22.
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In sum, defendant's

assertion that "none of the accomplices had any memory of others
present except, conveniently, Flores," see Br. App. at 22, is a
clear misrepresentation of the record.
Purpose of gathering

at Fox's

Apartment

Defendant suggests that because Dutson said there was
partying and drinking going on at Fox's apartment on the evening
before the arson, and because Chacon and Fox indicated that there
was no partying or drinking and that people had gathered to
discuss the Trujillo shooting, the alleged contradiction "bears
upon whether Flores was at the Fox apartment to be with friends
on a Saturday night or whether he was actually part of the
conspiracy to bomb the Archuleta home." Br. App. at 22-23.

A

cursory review of the facts set out above, Part IB, detailing
defendant's active involvement in the planning and preparation of
the offense, notwithstanding any partying or drinking that might
have been going on, is ample response to defendant's argument.
Defendant's

Presence

at Crime

Scene

Defendant argues that his presence at the crime scene should
be considered doubtful because Dutson, who did not see defendant
throw an incendiary device, assumed that defendant did so because
he heard back windows breaking, while "Chacon . . . testified
that Miguel said he threw a bomb in the side

window."

Br. App.

at 23. The distinction is trivial given the hurried events of
the arson, and especially in light of Dutson's testimony that all
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of the conspirators said they had thrown their incendiary devices
and Chacon's testimony that defendant admitted that he was at the
site, but that his bottle might not have gone off (R. 132 [23536]; R. 131 [140}) .10
Chacon's

and Fox's

Disingenuous

Claims

of

Non-Involvement

Defendant points out that Fox admitted she supplied the
gasoline at Chacon's request, that Chacon admitted she (Chacon)
was a Queen Mafia Disciple, and that both Chacon and Dutson
acknowledged that Chacon had purchased the gloves and masks.
However, because both Fox and Chacon claimed they merely watched
television while the incendiary devices were prepared in the
bathroom, from which the strong smell of gasoline emanated, their
disingenuous claims of non-involvement suggest that they were
shifting blame from themselves to defendant.

Br. App. at 23-24.

Insofar as Chacon's involvement is concerned, and to a much
lesser extent Fox's, defendant's claim has some merit.

It is not

surprising that an accomplice (Chacon) or one privy to illegality
(Fox) would downplay their involvement in a serious offense.
However, Chacon plainly acknowledged her involvement in admitting
10

To the extent defendant attempts to suggest a conflict in
the testimony about whether defendant was positioned at either a
back or side window, defendant improperly draws on the record.
Dutson never said he assumed defendant threw an incendiary
device. Rather, he simply said that he heard windows breaking in
the back of the house, from where he later saw his cohorts
running (R. 132 [235-36]). Chacon testified that defendant
reported that "he was on the side of the house, but he was not
sure if his bottle went off or not" (R. 131 [140]). Thus, the
witnesses did not contradict each other at all about which
windows defendant might have broken.
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she and Dutson purchased the gloves and masks to effect the
retaliation, and Fox acknowledged her purchase of the gasoline
(R. 131 [137, 184-87]).

More importantly, any downplaying by

Chacon and Fox of their involvement has little effect on
defendant's obviously much greater involvement.

Discrepancies

Concerning Construction

of Incendiary

Devices

Defendant correctly notes that Dutson said the beer bottles
came from Fox's apartment, whereas Chacon said Samora went to get
the bottles from outside the apartment, which Samora denied.
Defendant also claims similar discrepancies in the source of the
wicks, Dutson stating that ripped up towels were used, Chacon
stating that Dutson asked Fox for an old T-shirt, and Fox stating
she did not know where the rags came from.

Br. App. at 24. The

discrepancies concerning the source of the bottles pale alongside
the fact that Chacon testified that quart-sized "Miller" bottles
were used and Dutson said that quart-sized bottles, including an
"Ice 800" were used, the same type of bottles which were
recovered from the arson premises (R. 131 [153]; R. 132 [228,
256-62]).

There is no significant discrepancy concerning the

wicks because, contrary to defendant's bald assertion, Dutson
testified that they were made of "towels or something,
132 [225]).

rags"

(R.

Thus, Dutson's testimony does not contradict

Chacon's, but rather indicates that he was not concerned with the
source of the wicks.
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Alleged Discrepancies

Concerning

Conspirators'

Departure

Defendant claims discrepancies about whether the
conspirators lingered before leaving Fox's apartment and whether
they were wearing gloves and masks.

Br. App. at 24-25.

alleged discrepancies are at most trivial.

These

In fact, defendant

acknowledges that Chacon stated the four conspirators had their
masks and gloves in their pockets, and that Dutson stated that
they hid their masks and gloves under their clothing (R. 131
[138]; R. 132 [230-31]).

Moreover, contrary to defendant's

assertion, Chacon's testimony suggests that the party shortly
exited the apartment after trying on the masks and gloves, in
basic conformity with Fox's testimony (R. 131 [137, 189]).
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the substantially
consistent testimony of accomplices is so inherently improbable
or sufficiently inconclusive that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.
POINT II

-

THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARK REFERRING TO THE VICTIMS,
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT,
WAS ARGUABLY PROPER, AND EVEN IF NOT, WAS AT MOST
HARMLESS.

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's reference in closing
argument to the circumstances of the victims was reversible error
because it was irrelevant to elements of the charge and
calculated to inflame the jury to vindicate the victims in the
face of allegedly weak evidence.
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Defendant's lengthy argument

blows out of proportion an arguably proper, innocuous remark, and
ignores the circumstances in which the remark was made, the
propriety of the trial court's response, the plethora of curative
instructions, and the compelling weight of evidence of
defendant's guilt.
A.

The Standard of Review.

"This court will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct only if defendant has shown that
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to
the attention of the jury a matter it would not be
justified in considering in determining its verdict
and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial
such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its
absence, there would have been a more favorable result.
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990), quoting
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
494 U.S. 1090 (1990)).

Further elaborating on the standard of

review, this Court stated:
In determining whether a given statement constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed
in light of the totality of the evidence presented at
trial. Further, because the trial court is in the best
position to determine the impact of a statement upon
the proceedings, its rulings on whether the
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
Id. (citing Gardner, 789 P.2d at 287).
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B.

The Factual Background.

At the conclusion of his closing argument, defense counsel
stated:
But, in short, there have been many, many
important trials that have taken place in this
courtroom. But for Miguel Flores, this is most
important, and I would submit for you this is the most
important.
(R. 132 [319]).
In the course of his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor made
the challenged remark, followed by defense counsel's objections
and the trial court's ruling:
MR. YBARRA [PROSECUTOR]: Now, Mr. Fratto [defense
counsel] ends by saying, this is a most important
trial. It's important to the defendant, of course.
Many important cases have been tried in this court.
But I want to remind you as well that there is the
State in this case who also considers this an important
case. And there are victims. There is Mary Archuleta,
little Joseph Herrera and Candido Herrera and other
people in this house that came close to burning to
death.
MR. FRATTO: I'll object. I'll object to that line of
argument. That's improper. It tends to put to the
jury that they are to do something other than use their
prejudices. They are to be dispassionate.
MR. YBARRA: Your Honor, he brought about the point
about this being an important case.
THE COURT: Let me indicate this: I am going to
sustain the objection. The jury has been reminded that
the statements of counsel are not evidence and they are
not to consider them as evidence. I'll ask that you
move on.
MR. YBARRA: I simply make the point that this is an
important case.
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(R. 132 [325-26]).
After the close of argument, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's remark suggested
that the purpose of a guilty verdict was to "vindicate the
victims or society in general because expressed it was a horrific
crime," and served only to inflame the jury (R. 132 [328]).
The prosecutor responded by noting that it was defense
counsel who first brought up the importance of the outcome of the
case to defendant, that defense counsel's reference was an
improper appeal to the passions of the jury, and that it would be
improper to allow to go unrebutted defense counsel's suggestion
that only defendant's interest was of importance in the case.
The prosecutor further stated that the State never said it was
important to obtain a verdict, but only that the case was
important to the State and that other persons also had an
important interest in the matter (R. 132 [328-29]).
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, noting
that the jury had heard and would review again instructions
stating that statements of counsel were not evidence and that
they were not to base their verdict on passion or prejudice (R.
132 [329]).

The court concluded by stating,

I believe that as I was observing the jury when
the statements were made, I didn't observe anything out
of the ordinary in terms of expressions or that this
meant something special to them when Mr. Ybarra made
the statement. They were instructed to disregard it.
And I believe that is a sufficient instruction for me
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to give them. I don't think it was a statement that
they will remember or attach any special significance
to.
(R. 132 [329-30).
C.

The Prosecutor's Remark was Arguably Proper,
and Even if Improper, Harmless at Most.

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remark improperly
drew the juror's attention to the near deaths of the victims,
information which was not at issue in determining guilt for
aggravated arson.

Br. App. at 27. However, in State v.

Williams. 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982), an aggravated robbery case,
the defendant also alleged prosecutorial misconduct based on the
prosecutor's inviting the jury to consider what might have
happened had the victim of the robbery been injured.

Id. at 453.

Although there was evidence of the defendant's possession of a
knife seconds before the robbery, and evidently no necessity to
refer to the victim's possible injuries, the supreme court held
that the prosecutor's argument was not improper.

Id. at 453-54.

See also State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah
1982)(finding that prosecutor's reference to the "problem that we
have with drugs in our community" reasonably called to the jury's
attention the seriousness of the issues).
More particularly, the prosecutor's remark was reasonable
rebuttal to defense counsel's focusing the jury on the paramount
importance of the case to defendant without reference to the
significance the victim's would also attach to it (R. 132 [325]).
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In State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), during closing
argument, defense counsel emphasized that the defendant would
probably be a 67-year-old man when he got out of prison following
a life sentence, "broken and old and incapable of causing damage
to anyone."

750 P.2d at 559-60.

In response, the prosecutor

questioned whether defendant would be a better person fifteen
years hence when he got out of prison given the lack of remorse
he had shown during the trial.

Id. at 560. Defendant then

contended on appeal that the prosecutor's comments "were
misleading and had the potential of improperly influencing its
decision on the death penalty."

Id.

In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court found it
significant that "it was defense counsel who first commented that
in Utah, parole is a possibility under a life sentence."

Id.

The court held that while the prosecutor's remarks "were arguably
improper and prejudicial . . . , his comments, when placed within
the context of his and defense counsel's entire arguments, fall
within the ambit of permitted conduct."

Id.

See also Creviston,

646 P.2d at 754 (no misconduct in prosecutor's comments on the
significance of the defendant's presence at drug sale, made in
direct response to a theory of the defense); State v. Valdez, 30
Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1993)(no prosecutorial
misconduct where the prosecutor's rebuttal was in direct reply to
theory advanced by defense in its final argument and remarks were
within the range of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App.
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1997)(finding no misconduct in arguing in rebuttal that the
defendant had the option to call missing witness where the
defendant opened the door by arguing in closing that he should be
acquitted based on the State's failure to call the witness).
In this case, the prosecutor's remark was plainly triggered
by defense counsel's statement about the importance of the case
to defendant and is barely more than a statement that there were
victims involved.

Moreover, there can be no challenge to the

accuracy of the prosecutor's assertion that the victims came
close to burning to death.

The fire investigator testified that

if all the incendiary devices had gone off, the entire structure
would have been involved and probably collapsed before the fire
department arrived, and based on the placement of those devices,
Mr. Herrera's chances of survival were small (R. 132 [291-92]).
Defendant's principal challenge to the prosecutor's remark
is that it served to inflame the jury into basing its verdict on
the vindication of the victims.

Br. App. at 27.

In aid of this

challenge, defendant grossly mischaracterizes the quality of the
remark, arguing that it conjured up an "horrific image of an
event which never happened."

Br. App. 30.

In support, defendant

cites authority the facts of which are substantially
distinguishable from those in this case.11

11

In fact, the

Defendant cites, see Br. App. at 29, the following cases:
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d~T29, 650-652 (Utah 1995) (substantial
victim impact evidence found inadmissible under capital
sentencing statute); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229-30
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prosecutor's remark is a brief reference to a mere potential
impact, an impact supported by the evidence.
Even if the prosecutor's remark was improper, it was not
harmful.

See State v. Tavlor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Utah App.

1994)("Only if the improper statements are deemed to be harmful
will they require reversal.") (citation omitted).
First, the prosecutor only briefly commented on the victims'
circumstances, and in accord with the trial court's ruling, moved
on and concluded his argument (R. 132 [325-26] ) . Cf. Gardner,,
789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989) (prosecutor's calling the defendant
by the wrong name was not prejudicial where "[t]he reference,
taken in context, was inadvertent, was immediately corrected, and
did not interrupt the flow of the proceedings or focus the jury's
attention on an improper basis for the verdict"); State v. White,
880 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah App. 1994) (finding persuasive, in harmless
error analysis, that prosecutor did not "unduly emphasize or
otherwise misuse" exhibit of bloody pants).
Second, the trial court sustained defendant's objection,

(Utah 1989)(error to admit six-minute videotape focusing on
victim's bloody, beaten body and gaping stab wounds under rule
403, Utah Rules of Evidence); State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983
(Utah 1989)(characterizing as "repulsive," "vulgar," and
"profane," defendant's letter to murdered victim's father,
written for the purpose of taunting and inflicting guilt on the
victim's father); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 476 (Utah
1988)(improper admission of gruesome photos depicting gashes and
holes in victim's skull); cf. State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 23
(Utah App. 1994) (distinguishing blood-stained pants that were
merely "not particularly pleasant" from gruesome photographs, one
of three types of presumptively prejudicial evidence shifting the
burden of admissibility identified in State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d
1239, 1256 (Utah 1988), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911 (19$2)).
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immediately instructed the jury that statements of counsel were
not evidence, and instructed the prosecutor to move on, thus
minimizing any prejudicial effect (R. 132 [326]).

Additionally,

the jury was instructed in writing that (1) "[t]he law forbids
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" (Jury
Instruction 3, Arson PI. 58); and (2) "[s]tatements and argument
of counsel are not evidence" and "[the jury is] to consider only
the evidence in the case" (Jury Instruction 4, Arson PI. 60).
Notwithstanding defendant's argument, Utah appellate courts have
repeatedly acknowledged and relied upon the efficacy of curative
and limiting instructions in cases of alleged misconduct.12
Third, the trial court observed the jury when the statements
were made and "didn't observe anything out of the ordinary in
terms of expressions or that this meant something special to them

12

See State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989) (if
the jury was inclined to be influenced by the State's improper
remarks, "the jury instructions that were given cured any
potential error"); Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561 (no prejudice where
prosecutor's rebuttal in closing was merely a response issue
raised by defense counsel and jury admonished to consider only
evidence introduced at trial); Creviston, 646 P.2d at 754
(finding no error where jury cautioned to consider only the
evidence and to disregard utterances not having a basis in the
evidence); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986)
(plainly implying that prosecutor's lengthy and improper comments
on matters outside evidence would have 6een cured if the court
had granted the defendant's objection and admonished the jury to
disregard the comments); State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 550 (Utah
App. 1993)(prosecutor's incomplete statement of law not harmful
wnere trial court gave a complete instruction on the law); State
v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990)(finding "the
trial court's immediate admonition that the statement be stricken
and that no further reference be made to the statement, rendered
harmless the otherwise improper testimony").
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when Mr. Ybarra made the statement" (R. 132 [330]).

See State v.

Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Utah 1989)(finding no prejudice in
witness's reference to the defendant's parole status where jury
instructed to disregard the evidence, curative instructions
given, and "the trial court felt that the statement was lost on
the jury and noted that it observed no visible reaction of the
jurors to the testimony").
Fourth, as set out at length in Part IB, above, the evidence
of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and consistent with respect
to all the significant details of the offense, not only with
respect to the accomplices' testimony, but also as that testimony
was confirmed by investigator's observations of the crime
scene.13

It took the jury only 50 minutes to decide this case

(R. 132 [330, 332]), and it's obvious that the decision was not
based on the prosecutor's remark.
Finally, defendant argues that, on policy grounds,
prosecutorial misconduct should effectively be treated as per se
reversible error, thereby nullifying harmless error analysis.
App. Br. at 37.

In State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App.

13

See Carter, 888 P.2d at 653 (no prejudice where improper
victim impact testimony was relatively mild and evidence of guilt
overwhelming); State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993)
("When there is strong proof of guilt, the conduct or remark of a
prosecutor is not presumed prejudicial."); State v. Span. 819
P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991)(prejudice "negligible" where jury would
likely have pondered issues related to testimony improperly
elicited and trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the
objectionable material); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119
(Utah App. 1995)(no prejudice, assuming arguendo error in
prosecutor's remarks, in light of all the evidence).
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1996), this Court rejected a per se prejudice claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, noting that "[w]hile other
jurisdictions have found that egregious misconduct by a
prosecutor can "so color[] the proceedings that [defendant] was
denied a fair trial . . ., Utah requires a more concrete showing
of prejudice compared to the strength of the evidence against
defendant."

Id. at 755 (citation omitted).

In sum, the prosecutor's reference to the importance of the
case to the victims with a brief reference to their circumstances
was arguably a proper response to defense counsel's informing the
jury that the case was important to defendant.

But if the remark

was improper, it was not prejudicial.
POINT III

-

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE TO THE PLEA-TAKING BECAUSE HE DID NOT
MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AND FAILS TO CLAIM
PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL. IN ANY CASE, BECAUSE
THE COURT FULLY AND PROPERLY INCORPORATED THE PLEA
AFFIDAVIT INTO THE PROCEEDINGS, THE REQUIREMENTS
OF RULE 11 WERE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH.

Defendant claims that because the trial court failed to
inform him during the plea colloquy of the possibility that
consecutive sentences might be imposed, the court failed to
strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of
Evidence.

App. Br. at 38.14 The claim is totally meritless and

14

Defendant also appears to suggest that the trial court's
alleged failure to inform him of the possibility of consecutive
sentences was further compounded by his having entered his plea
with the understanding that he would receive concurrent
sentences. Br. App. at 38. The suggestion is misleading and
unfounded. Defendant acknowledges that, in accord with the plea
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should not even be considered in the circumstances of the case.
A.

Because Defendant Failed to First Move to Withdraw
His Guilty Plea in the Trial Court, His Claim Should
Not be Reviewed on the Merits.

Defendant did not first move to withdraw his plea before
appealing the manner in which his plea was taken.

"Defendant

must first move to set aside the plea; he or she can not
challenge the plea for the first time on appeal from the
conviction."
1988).

Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah App.

Moreover, defendant has failed to allege that the trial

court committed plain error or that he suffered manifest
injustice in the manner in which the court accepted his guilty
plea to murder.

See State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah

affidavit (Arson PI. 59-66, attached at Addendum B) the
prosecutor fulfilled the State's promise to recommend concurrent
sentencing (R. 101 [3]). Br. App. at 41 n.7. Further, the plea
affidavit states that defendant understood that the court was not
bound by any sentencing recommendation (Arson PI. at 63).
Also, the State notes that it principally relies on the
adequacy of the plea affidavit and the manner in which the trial
court incorporated the affidavit into the record in refuting
defendant's claim. However, the record also makes clear that
defendant had actual notice of the possibility of consecutive
sentences not only from the trial court, but from his counsel as
well. During the plea colloquy, the trial court confirmed with
defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor that the plea
agreement included the imposition of the group criminal
activities enhancement (popularly known as the "gang"
enhancement) and the gun enhancement, consecutive
with sentences
imposed for defendant's other convictions (R. 101 [2-4, 13]).
Moreover, at sentencing, defense counsel, let slip that defendant
knew of consecutive sentencing and acknowledged that defendant
pleaded guilty "because of representations that the State would
not recommend consecutive
sentencing" (R. 136 [5])(emphasis
added). Since the trial court informed defendant, and defendant
acknowledged, that any recommendations were not binding on the
court's sentencing discretion (R. 101 [14]), it is plain in these
circumstances that defendant, a young career criminal, knew of
the possibility of consecutive sentencing.
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App. 1990)(addressing voluntariness of guilty plea for the first
time on appeal under plain error doctrine where trial court found
to have committed multiple errors in accepting plea).
The record plainly and readily shows that the trial court
strictly complied with the requirements of rule 11. Therefore,
this Court should decline to review defendant's claim on appeal.
B.

Even Considering Defendant's Claim, it is Plain
that the Trial Court Strictly Complied with the
Requirements of Rule 11 by Incorporating the
Plea Affidavit into the Record.

Rule 11(e) (4) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered. . . . "
required.

Strict compliance with rule 11 is

State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991).

A

trial court must "personally establish that the defendant' s
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on
record

the

that the defendant knowingly waived his or her

constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime."
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam).

In

addition, the trial court must determine that the defendant
""possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts.1"

State v. Breckenridae. 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah

1983)(citation omitted).
However, the trial court is not "rigidly tied to the
colloquy with the defendant [or] relegated to rote recitation of
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the rule 11 elements when entertaining a plea."

Abeyta, 852 P.2d

at 996 (citing State v. Maauire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Utah
1991) (per curiam)).
In Maauire, the supreme court sought to "make clear that
strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so long
as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the
record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled."
830 P.2d at 218.

Id.

In furtherance of that objective, the court

stated:
When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the
record (as when the trial judge ascertains in the plea
colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood,
and acknowledges all the information contained
therein), they may properly form a part of the basis
for finding rule 11 compliance.
Id. at 217. Quoting with approval State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,
477 (Utah App. 1991)(Russon, J., concurring), cert, denied, 836
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), the court further stated:
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11
compliance be demonstrated on the record at the time
the ... plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit is
used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed
during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct
an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands
the affidavit and voluntarily signed it. . . . Any
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be
clarified during the plea hearing, as must any
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea
colloquy. Then the affidavit itself, signed by the
required parties, can be incorporated into the record.
The efficiency-promoting function of the affidavit is
thereby served, in that the court need not repeat,
verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed and
answered in the affidavit, unless Rule 11 by its terms
specifically requires such repetition.
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Id. at 218.15
Overlooking Macruire, defendant particularly relies on State
v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).

Br. App. at 40, 43.16 However, in clarifying

the appropriate role of a properly incorporated plea affidavit
and rejecting the view that the court's "strict compliance test
requires a time-consuming, mechanical oral recitation of each
element mentioned in rule 11," the supreme court specifically
repudiated this Court's "rigid view" of "the record" adopted in
Dastrup, which "apparently construed *the record' to mean only
the transcript of the oral plea colloquy, thereby concluding that
*the trial court must base its findings solely on the colloquy,
without considering any statements made in the affidavit'".
Maauire. 830 P.2d at 218 n.2.
In this case, as defendant concedes, see Br. App. at 43, the
plea affidavit stated that consecutive sentences might be imposed
if defendant was awaiting sentencing on another offense on which
15

See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1996)
(looking at defendant's plea affidavit and the plea colloquy
between defendant and the trial judge) <• State v. Mills, 8 98 P.2d
819, 823 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting Maguire with approval in noting
that "when plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the
record . . . they may properly form a part of the basis for
finding rule 11 compliance"); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581
(Utah App. 1992)(finding rule 11 compliance based on proper
incorporation of plea affidavit).
16
Similarly relied on by defendant and of dubious authority
are State v. Pharris, 777 P.2d 772, 777 n.13 (Utah App.
1990)(pre-Macruire case interpreting Gibbons to preclude use of
affidavit in satisfying requirements of rule 11), and State v.
Vasilicopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah App.)(affidavit stating that
the defendant would be subject to consecutive sentences only
under certain conditions inadequately reflected rule 11
requirements), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
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he had been convicted (Arson PI. at 62). Although the trial
court engaged defendant in a discussion of rights he was waiving
by pleading guilty to murder, the court neglected to specifically
mention that consecutive sentences could be imposed (R. 101 [914]).

However, the court scrupulously followed the procedure set

out in Smith, incorporating the plea affidavit into the record by
first ascertaining from defense counsel that (1) the affidavit
had been prepared, (2) counsel had reviewed the affidavit with
defendant, (3) counsel believed defendant understood the
affidavit, (4) counsel had gone over the affidavit "word by
word," and (5) counsel believed defendant understood his
constitutional rights (R. 101 [4-5] ). 1 7

Immediately thereafter,

through colloquy with and positive affirmation from defendant,
the trial court ascertained that (1) defendant was aware of plea
affidavit his counsel had prepared and had enough time to go over
it, (2) counsel had read the affidavit to defendant,
(3) defendant had an opportunity to ask questions about anything
he did not understand, (4) defendant was fully aware of the
contents of the affidavit as a result of reviewing it with his
counsel, (5) defendant was not under the influence of drugs,
alcohol or anything that would impair his ability to think
clearly, and (6) by signing the affidavit defendant understood he
would be admitting that its contents were accurate and correct
(R. 101 [5-7]).

17

The transcript of the relevant plea colloquy is attached
at Addendum C.
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When the court asked defendant if he had made a voluntary
decision to sign the affidavit, defendant responded
affirmatively, but then said, "I don't want to do this" (R. 101
[8]).

The trial court allowed defendant a recess in which to

discuss his concerns with his counsel.

Following the recess, the

court again elicited from defendant positive responses
establishing that defendant had an opportunity to speak with his
counsel and have counsel answer his questions, and that defendant
had signed the affidavit freely and voluntarily.

Defense counsel

also stated that he was convinced defendant was acting knowingly
and voluntarily (R. 101 [8-9]).
11

[I] n cases where the judge does sufficiently question the

defendant about his affidavit, the affidavit should be permitted
to cover any gaps in the colloquy."
(Russon, J., concurring).

Dastrup, 818 P.2d at 597

Because the court so thoroughly

questioned defendant about his affidavit in this case, any
omission in the colloquy does not negate that rule 11
requirements were strictly complied with.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed.
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions,
the State does not request that it be set for oral argument or
that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of March, 1998.
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Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

76-6-103. Aggravated arson.
(1) Aperson is guilty of aggravated arson if iy means offireor explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the
offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of thefirstdegree.

77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice — Instruction to jury.
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to
the efifect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution,
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judgefindsthe testimony of
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, exceptforan infraction) a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the mfafonmn sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.

(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits forfilingany motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court,
(h) (1) The judge ahall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the timefortender of the plea.
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appealfromthe judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal ahall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. I 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996.)
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I n The Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t c o u r t Of S a l t Lake c o u n t y
S t a t e o f Utah
THE STATE OP UTAH/
Plaintiff

iOuLnuUi,

3,19%

STATEMENT OP DEPENDANT
CERTIPICATE OP COUNSEL
AND ORDER

\ ^ c i A. &arvs>

Criminal No.

^bWOQ^OS

PS

^ D e f e n d a n t

COKES NOW,

K'v<,if.(

A.F\r>i£>

.the Defendant in this

case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty)(no contest) to the
following crime(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION
A.

PUNISHMENT
Min/Max a n d / o r
Minimum Mandatory

1

SWCKA

TP"

£:K3H-AtOC,e-M£tO-t,S

B.

1 yr

M^F-CH-TI^
f«*or

c.

D.
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I have received a copy of the (charger (information) against
me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and elements of
the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty)(no contest).
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as
f o l l o w s :

-^Vs6

A g - k / i r W ^

* . g t t / ^

U A c W

OifC.L^^^fsCJS

CaJ\&Lt\C\M

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s)
charged are as follows: T . y K W i - A

Q4

Cjjg

SOUTH

M ^ « J O

T W a . ^ . -CirtA

^ « H ^ S, L, f .^ C« H

<z\\A**>

/L« A, Cau^ijJ

I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the Court at no cost to me.

I recognize that a

condition of my sentence may be to,, require me to pay an amount,
as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.
2.

I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel.

If I

have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,

000060

Uj^

intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this

statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges
my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of
my plea of guilty.
4.
is

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney

t/cMii^ X

*^iw\Ay)A

, and I have had an opportunity

to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my
guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have
them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the

right to compel my witness (s) by subpoena at State expense to
testify in court in my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me

I need only plead
trial.

,f

not guilty'1 and the matter will be set for

At the trial rhe State of Utah will have the burden of

proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If
3

000061

the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9*

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the State.
10.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for

each offense to which I plead (guilty)(no contest).
»

•"••

I know that

•

by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an offense to which I plead
(guilty)(no contest).

I know that by pleading (guilty)(no

contest) to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence
that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory
sentence for that offense.

I know that the sentence may be

consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine or both.

I know

that in addition to a fine, a (twenty-five [25%])(eighty-five
[85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will
be imposed.

I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to

make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amount, if my plea is to more
than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation, parole,

or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.

4
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12.

I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no

contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set
out in the preceding paragraphs.

I also know that by entering

such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed
the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime (s) for which my
plea(s) is/are entered.
13.

My plea(s) of (guilty)(no contest) (isj(is not) the

result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting
attorney.

The promises, duties and provisions of this plea

bargain, if any# are fully contained in the Plea Agreement
attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my

plea(s) of (guilry) (no contest) , I must do so by filing a motion
within thirty(30) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on
the Judge.

I also know that any options they express to me as to

what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the
Court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind

have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises
except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement,
have been made to me.

5
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17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I
am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement.
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements
are correct*
18.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
19.

XD

I am

through the

\%

years of age; I have attended school
grade and I can read and understand the

English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or
intoxicants which would impair my judgement when the decision was
made to enter the plea(s).

I am not presently under the

influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my
judgement.
20.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,

mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

3

day of

bccL

f

19^fr .

DEFENDA-NT

^Wa. | W * ^ t :

S U v ^

r*<u>**>*A «L<*CUCTXL^ S V V W , ^
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CERTIFICATE OP ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for

f\\g*^\ (VP)zSfe,s,

,

the Defendant above, and that I now he/she has read the statement
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of
its contents and is mentally and physically competent.

To the

best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime (s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated
and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate
and true.

^'ATtORNEX/FOft DEFENDANT/BAR #

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against

M i &u*V A. P/ar*-i

, Defendant.

I have

reviewed this statement of the Defendant and find that of the
Defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are
true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion
to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant.

The plea

negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the
7
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Court.

There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence

would support the conviction of Defendant for the offens.e(s) for
which the plea(s) is/are entered and the acceptance of the
plea(s) would serve the public interest.

*Zfl^t^-

¥/*&

PROSECUTING A.©TORNEX/BAR #X

ORDER
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and
the certification of the defendant and counsel, the Court
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so
ordered that the Defendant's plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) to
the charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

^3

day of gjg <lSUYvdv4S\ _*^*3

h «

8
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ADDENDUM C

r^Trkia

COURT.

i r.nu vudlcial District

Ul'T 1 7 1997
l

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-O0o-

4

STATE OF UTAH#

5
6
7

~U] >9*£C9-UfiT|

Plaintiff,

Case No. 961900905 FS

vs.

CHANGE OF PLEA

MIGUEL FLORES#

8

(Videotape Proceedings)
Defendant*

9

-o0o~

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of December,

12

1996, commencing at the hour of 1:36 p.m., the above-

13

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

14

SANDRA PEULER, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for

15

the purpose of this cause, and that the following videotape

16

proceedings were had.

17

-o0o~

18

A P P E A R A N C E S

19

For the State:

RODWICKE YBARRA
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

KEVIN J. KURUMADA
Attorney at Law
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

20
21
22
23
24

FiLED

25

OCT 2 2 1S97
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

~

W

"'

«

«-

38S BRAHMA OftlVE (801) 2*6-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH §4107

990215-64

--.V

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

We're on the record.

The matter before the Court today is State of Utah
vs. Miguel Flores. The case number is 961900905.

I'll

indicate for the record that Mr. Flores is present with
counsel, Mr. Kurumada.

The State is also represented by Mr.

Ybarra.
This matter is set for trial tomorrow and I'm
advised that there's been an agreement reached and perhaps I
could have counsel tell me what that is.
MR. KURUMADA:

That's correct, your

Honor.
MR. YBARRA:

Yes, your Honor.

The

defendant now, of course, stands charged in this case with
the offense of murder, a first-degree felony, with both gang
and gun enhancements.

He's also been previously convicted

of the crime of aggravated arson before your Honor, firstdegree felony with gang enhance—well, I guess it does not
have a gang enhancement.
In addition, your Honor, there is an under—an
outstanding investigation that indicates that Mr. Flores may
be involved in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit
murder*
The State, after we have researched the issue of

2

the potential impact on the Board of Pardons with regard to
1

consecutive and concurrent sentences on life sentences
2

being, as we understand it, that doesn't have a whole lot of
3

impact, inasmuch as the Board of Pardons has authority to
4

keep the person in prison as long as they think appropriate
5

on any one of those life sentences, under all of those
6

circumstances, we have felt it appropriate to offer that if
7

the defendant changes his plea to guilty as charged in this
8

case, that is to the criminal homicide, murder, with both
9

gang and gun enhancements, resulting in an enhanced minimum
1(0

of nine years to life, with a consecutive one year for the
11

gun enhancement, the State would move the Court at the time
12

of sentencing, to sentence the defendant concurrently with
13

the previously adjudged aggravated arson, and that we would
14

agree not to file charges on the outstanding investigation
15

of solicitation to commit murder, as long as no overt act
16

occurred in that case, that in any way endangered the
17

purported victim, Elizabeth Chacon.
18

THE COURT:

Let me just ask, Mr. Ybarra,

19

have you consulted with the family members of the victim
20

about this proposal?
21

MR. YBARRA:

I have, your Honor.

22

They're present in the courtroom and I have spoken with them
23

and explained to them what we were going to propose and I
24

believe that they're in agreement with it, they're nodding
25

1

their heads, your Honor. Yes.
THE COURT: All right.

2
3
4
5

All right.

And I assume then that you've carefully weighed

any input or concerns that they expressed to you and that
you fully explained your reasons to them for this proposal?
MR. YBARRA:

6

9
10

i have, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

7
8

Is that correct?

Thank you.

I

appreciate that.
Mr. Kurumada, does that accurately set forth the
plea agreement that you've reached in this case?
MR. KURUMADA:

11

It does, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Has the

12
statement of defendant been prepared?
13
MR. KURUMADA:

It has.

14
THE COURT: Have you had time to go over
15
that with your client?
16
MR. KURUMADA:

Yes, I have.

17
THE COURT:

Do you believe at this time

18
that he understands the contents of that agreement?
19
MR. KURUMADA:

I do.

20
THE COURT: And have you had enough time
21
to go over all of this with him so that you believe he
22
understands the proceedings this afternoon?
23
MR. KURUMADA:
24
word by word.
25

Yes. We've gone over it

THE COURT: And you also believe he

1
2

understands his Constitutional rights?
MR. KURUMADA:

3

THE COURT: All right.

4
5

I do.
Let me ask the

defendant some questions.
Is your correct name Miguel Flores?

6

MR. FLORES: Yes.

7

THE COURT: Do you have a middle name,

8
Mr. Flores?
9

MR. FLORES:

1b

Yes. Angel.

THE COURT: What is your middle name?

11

MR. FLORES: Angel.
12
THE COURT:

And that's spelled

13
A-n-g-e-1?
14
You need to say yes or no, please.
15
MR. FLORES: Yes.
16
THE COURT: Thank you.
17
What's your date of birth, sir?
18
MR. FLORES:

8-18-76.

19
THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Flores, Mr.

2D
Kurumada tells me that you've had an opportunity to go over
21
the statement that he's prepared, that's the document that's
22
in front of you.

Have you had enough time to go over that

23
with him?
24
Do you know which document I'm referring to, Mr.
25

1

Flores?

MR. FLORES: Yeah.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. FLORES: Yes.

4

THE COURT: All right.

5
6

Yes or no?

Did you read

that document or did Mr . Kurumada read it to you?

MR. FLORES: Yeah.

7

THE COURT: Which was it?

Did you read

8
it or did he read it to you?
9

MR. FLORES: He read it to me.
10
THE COURT: All right.

When he read it

11
to you, did you also have an opportunity to ask him
12
questions about it, if there was anything in there that you
13
did not understand?
14

MR. FLORES: Yes.
15
THE COURT:

So, as you stand before me

16
now, have you had a—an adequate amount of time to discuss
17
the document with him and to go over it so that you are
18
fully aware of the contents of that document?
19

MR. FLORES: Yes.
20
THE COURT: All right.

Are you

21
presently under the influence of any alcohol or drugs today,
22
Mr. Flores?
23

MR. FLORES: No.
24
THE COURT: When's the last time you had
25
6

1

any alcohol?

2
3

8
9

THE COURT:

Pardon?

THE COURT: All right.

5

7

'95.

MR. FLORES: '95.

4

6

MR. FLORES:

When's the last

time you had a controlled substance, prescribed or
otherwise?
MR. FLORES: X don't have them.
THE COURT:

You've never had a

prescriptive medication that you've taken?
10
MR. FLORES: No.
11
12
13

THE COURT:

Is there anything that would

impair your ability to think clearly today, Mr. Flores?
MR. FLORES: No.

14
THE COURT: All right.

So, you're

15
thinking clearly today; is that correct?
16
17
18
19

MR. FLORES:

Yeah. Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

You've told me

that you understand the contents of the statement that
you've gone over with Mr. Kurumada.

Do you understand that

20
if you sign that statement, that what you will be telling me
21
by your signature is that everything in that document is
22
accurate and correct.

Do you understand that?

23
MR. FLORES: Yes.
24
THE COURT: Have you made a voluntary
25

decision to sign this statement?

1

MR. FLORES: Yeah.

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes or no.

Don't say yeah.

MR. FLORES: Yes.

4

THE COURT:

5

Yes or no?

MR. FLORES: Yes.

6

THE COURT: All right.

7

If that's your

voluntary decision, you may go Jahead and indicate that by

8

signing the statement and I'll :receive it.

9

MR. FLORES: I don't want to do this.

10

MR. KURUMADA:

11

MR. FLORES:

12

I ain't going to do this.

MR. KURUMADA:

13

Huh?

Can we have a minute,

your Honor?
14

THE COURT: Yes. Would you like to go

15

off the record for a minute?

16

MR. KURUMADA:

17

Yes. Well, I—I think we

need to go back18
THE COURT: All right. We' 11 be off the
19
record for a minute or two.
20
(Off the record.)
21
THE COURT:

Let me indicate that we're

22
back on the record.

All parties and counsel are present as

23
I indicated before.
24
Mr. Flores has had an opportunity to discuss some
25
.

8

matters with Mr. Kurumada and I'll indicate for the record
1
that Mr. Flores has executed the statement of defendant.
2
Before I receive that, let me just ask, Mr.
3
Flores, if you had an opportunity to speak further with Mr.
4
Kurumada—•
5
MR. FLORES: Yes.
6
THE COURT: --and have him answer your
7
questions?
8
MR. FLORES: Yes.
9
THE COURT:

All right.

And you've

10
signed the statement of defendant freely and voluntarily; is
11
that also correct?
12
MR. FLORES: Yes.
13
THE COURT: All right.

And Mr.

14
Kurumada, you're also convinced that Mr. Flores is going
15
this knowingly and voluntarily?
16
MR. FLORES: Yes, your Honor.
17
THE COURT: All right.

Let me ask Mr.

18
Kurumada, to state a factual basis for the plea.
19
MR. KURUMADA:

Yes. The—the elements

2D
of the crime with which he's charged are that the defendant,
21
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
22
indifference to human life engaged in conduct which created
23
a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the
24
death of another, to-wit: Joseph Miera.
25

His conduct, as outlined in this plea agreement—

1
2
3
4
5
6

or excuse me, in this affidavit of guilty plea, is that: "I,
Miguel Flores, fired shots in the hone occupied by Joseph
Miera, thereby causing his death.

February 22nd, 1996, at 918 South Navajo Street, Salt Lake
City, Salt Lake City/County, Utah."
THE COURT: And Mr. Flores, is that an

7
8

accurate statement of what you did?
MR. FLORES: Yes.

9

THE COURT: Let me ask you some

10
11

These acts occurred on

additional questions, Mr. Flores, about your Constitutional
rights.

If I say anything that you do not understand, will

12
you let me know?
13
MR. FLORES: Yes.

14

THE COURT: All right.

15

You understand,

first of all, that you're not required to enter a guilty
16
plea today or any other day.

You have the right to proceed

17
to trial and we have that trial set for tomorrow.

Do you

18
understand that right?
19
MR. FLORES: Yes.
20
THE COURT:

You understand that if you

21
proceed to trial, that you're presumed to be innocent and
22
the only way that you can be convicted is if the State is
23
able to prove each element of this offense beyond a
24
reasonable doubt.

Do you understand that?

25

10

1
2
3
4

MR. FLORES: Yes.
THE COURT: Specifically, in this case—
Mr. Kurumada just went over the elements, but let me go over
them with you, too, to make sure that you understand
everything that the State would be required to prove.

5
6

And that is as follows: At 918 South Navajo in
Salt Lake County, on or about February 22nd, 1996, that you,

7
as a party to the offense, intentionally or knowingly caused
8
the death of Joey Miera and/or intending to cause serious
9
bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly dangerous
10
to human life, that caused the death of Joey Miera and/or
11
that you, acting under circumstances evidencing depraved
12
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which created
13
a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the
14
death of Joey Miera.
15
Do you understand all of those elements that the
16
State would be required to prove?
17
MR. FLORES: Yes.
18
THE COURT: All right.

Do you

19
understand also that you'd have the right to have a jury
20
trial, and again, the only way you could be convicted is if
21
all of the jurors unanimously agreed that the State had met
22
this burden of proof?
23
MR. FLORES: Yes.
24
THE COURT:
25

11

You understand that if you

1
2
3
4

proceeded to trial, you'd have the right to see the
witnesses, face-to-face, who would testify against you and
you'd have the right to have your attorney cross-examine
them on your behalf?
MR. FLORES: Yes.

5

THE COURT:

6
7
8
9

You also understand that at

the time of trial, you'd have the right to present evidence
to the Court and to the jury also that would include your
own right to testify, if you chose to do so but that would
be a voluntary decision that you could make, no one could

10
force you to testify and if you chose not to testify, no one
11
could draw any negative conclusions from that silence.

Do

12
you understand that right as well?
13
MR. FLORES: Yes.
14
THE COURT:

Do you also understand that

15
if you were convicted following a jury trial, that you'd
16
have the right to appeal that conviction to an appellate
17
court?
18
MR. FLORES: Yes.
19
THE COURT:

Do you understand that by

2D
entering a guilty plea today, that you give up each of those
21
rights that I've just asked you about?
22
MR. FLORES: Yes.
23
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty to
24
this charge because you're actually guilty of this offense?
25

12

MR. FLORES:

1

THE COURT:

2
3
4
5
6

Yeah.
Do you understand that this

offense is charged as a first-degree felony that carries
with it a term at the Utah State Prison of not less than
five years, the term nay be up to life, and it also carries
with it a maximum fine of up to $10,000; do you understand
that?

7
8
9

MR. FLORES: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you also understand that

by adding what's commonly called the gang enhancement and
10
that is the enhancement for offenses committed by three or
11
more persons, that that adds an enhanced sentence, which
12
means in effect that the minimum term at the Utah State
13
Prison, instead of five years would be nine years, which
14
could be up to life?
15
MR. FLORES: Yes.
16
THE COURT:

Do you also understand that

17
with the firearm enhancement, that the statute requires the
18
Court to sentence you to an additional, that is a
19
consecutive one-year term, the Court may sentence you to an
20
additional indeterminate term up to five years?
21
MR. FLORES: Yes.
22
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you

23
understand that the recommendations that have been made to
24
me today by the prosecutor—give him a minute to get out—
25
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1

all right.
Do you understand that I've heard some

2
3
4
5
6

recommendations from the prosecutor today relative to
sentencing?

Do you understand that those recommendations

are not binding on me; in other words, I will listen to them
carefully, I will consider them, but I'm not required to
follow them?

7
MR. FLORES: Yes.
8
THE COURT:

All right.

Has anybody

9
promised you anything in return for this guilty plea?
10
MR. FLORES: No.
11
THE COURT:

Has anybody threatened you

12
or coerced you in any manner to get you to enter a guilty
13
plea?
14
MR. FLORES: No.
15
THE COURT:

Are you satisfied with the

16
representation you've received from your attorney?
17
MR. FLORES:

Yeah—yes.

18
THE COURT: Are there any other
19
questions, Counsel, that either of you would have me pose to
20
Mr. Flores before he enters his plea?
21
MR. YBARRA:

I have none.

22
MR. KURUMADA:

No, your Honor.

23
THE COURT: All right.
24
enter your plea at this time, Mr. Flores.
25
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I'll ask you to

Hill you waive a formal reading, Mr. Kurumada?
MR. KURUMADA:

He would, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I believe that the
statement of defendant acknowledges the portion of the
Information that talks about acting under circumstances
evidencing depraved indifference; is that the portion that
we're proceeding under today?
MR. KURUMADA:

That's correct.

And that

is in the statement.
THE COURT: All right.
ask you to enter your plea then.

Mr. Flores, I'll

The charge before the

Court is criminal homicide, murder, a first-degree felony,
at 918 South Navajo in Salt Lake County, on or about
February 22nd, 1996, with the allegation that you, as a
party to the offense, acting under circumstances evidencing
depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct
which created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby
caused the death of Joey Miera.
How do you plead to that charge, sir?
MR. FLORES:
THE COURT:

Guilty.
I do find, Mr. Flores, that

your plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily made and
will therefore receive it and enter it as a conviction at
this time.

I'll receive the statement of defendant that's

been filled out.

15

I also want to tell you about two additional

1
2
3
4
5
6

rights that you have, Mr. Flores. The first right is the
right to ask the Court to let you withdraw your guilty plea,
if you have good cause to do that; but any motion to
withdraw your guilty plea has to be filed within 30 days of
today's date. Do you understand that?
MR. FLORES: Yes.

7

THE COURT:

8
9
10
11

You also have the right to

be sentenced during a particular tine period that begins
three days from today and goes up to 45 days from today's
date.
I note that you're awaiting sentencing on an

12
earlier charge.

I spoke to counsel about having the pre-

13
sentence report prepared in connection with this offense
14
also, so that A P & P could address both offenses at the
15
same time.

I suspect they'd be able to do it within the 45-

16
day time period, but to the extent that it takes them any
17
longer to complete that, are you willing to waive the
18
maximum time for sentencing?
19
MR. FLORES: Yes.
2D
THE COURT: Are you willing to also
21
waive the maximum time for sentencing on the aggravated
22
arson charge, because obviously, if I sentence you on both
23
of them at the same time, that one will have to be further
24
set over as well.
25
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MR. FLORES:

1

Oivania, what date would we use, if we give then—

3

THE CLERK:

4

8
9

Well, we could do it January

13th, that's probably two days short (inaudible)
THE COURT: We can go with January 13th

6
7

!

THE COURT: All right.

2

5

Yes.

or we can go to the 27th.

Oivania tells ne that the 13th is

short of the 45 days, but I would guess that A P & P is
already far enough along in preparing the other pre-sentence
report that they've got the background information that we

10
need, so I think we could probably do it on the 13th.
11
MR. YBARRA:

I would suggest as well,

12
your Honor, that is a probability.
13
MR. KURUMADA:

That's fine.

14
THE COURT: All right.

He'll set this

15
natter for sentencing then on January 13th at 1:30. That
16
will be on the regular crininal calendar.
17
Is there anything else that needs to be addressed
18
today?
19
MR. KURUMADA:

No, your Honor.

20
MR. YBARRA:

I have no other natters.

21
THE COURT: All right.
22
MR. KURUMADA:

Oh.

23
THE COURT:

I'll receive that.

24
MR. YBARRA:
25
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Other than I assume you've

1

stricken the trial date tomorrow.
THE COURT:

2
date.

I will strike the trial

Thank you for reminding me of that.

3
We'll be in recess.
4
MR. YBARRA:

Thank you, your Honor.

5
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
6
7
* * *

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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20
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22
23
24
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